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FIRST PEOPLES AND HUMAN RIGHTS,
A SOUTH SEAS PERSPECTIVE
THE RIGHT HONORABLE DAME SIAN ELIAS*
I am honored by the invitation to speak to you today in this distinguished lecture
series. I am conscious that I follow in the steps of speakers of great reputation and
that this series is held to honor an outstanding lawyer, herself a wonderful and
inspiring public speaker. So the standards are high. Roberta Ramo is someone who
is admired and respected everywhere. She has been a trailblazer for women in law.
At the far end of the world, where I come from, she is known and admired
especially for her pioneering work as first woman President of the American Bar
Association and first woman President of the American Law Institute. Both are
organizations that are critical in promoting a world culture of respect for law and
in making sure the law we practice is fit for the modern societies it serves. It is a
very great privilege to be asked to speak in this lecture in her honor. It is also a very
great personal pleasure to be able to record my admiration for Roberta Ramo here
in her home state, to which she has given such service, and to thank her and Dr.
Ramo for their generosity in bringing us here and for their hospitality and
friendship.
It has been suggested to me that I might tell you something of the dealings of the
indigenous people of New Zealand and the law. I am glad to do so, because it has
enabled me to reflect on the connections between our countries as each has
addressed the just claims of our indigenous peoples. Indeed, the case law of the U.S.
Supreme Court has been highly influential in New Zealand, Australia, and Canada
as our legal systems have struggled to translate pre-colonial rights into the law
imposed during settlement. Although we have adopted quite different responses,
many of the underlying themes and challenges are common.
The issues raised by indigenous peoples today raise similar themes. The claims
for sufficient autonomy and authority to enable indigenous cultures to live and
prosper in the modern states of which they are part no longer seem as preposterous
as they once did, even in unitary states like mine with no federal model of powersharing. It is true that care needs to be taken about importing solutions from or
rejecting those solutions rejected in different legal and political contexts. I think in
the past that may have led to some confusion in national legal systems. But the
immediate point to be made is that there is enough inherent commonality in the
experiences and needs of indigenous people to suggest that we should be open to
the ideas of other countries and other legal systems in shaping our own. So, let me
tell you a little about the background in my country.
I. A NEW START?
In 1642 the Dutch explorer, Abel Tasman, made unexpected landfall in southern
seas in a country he named New Zealand. The bay he anchored in used to be known
as “Murderers’ Bay,” because members of Tasman’s crew, the first Europeans to

* The Right Honorable Dame Sian Elias, G.N.Z.M., Chief Justice of New Zealand. Dame Elias presented
these remarks at the University of New Mexico School of Law in Albuquerque, New Mexico, on October 23, 2008,
where she was the featured speaker for the biannual Ramo Lecture on International Law and Justice.
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encounter the native people of New Zealand, did not survive. Tasman, prudently,
sailed swiftly away.
New Zealand remained a tiny squiggle on maps until the brilliant English
navigator, James Cook (whose North American connection was in assisting in the
British victory over the French in Quebec), came to New Zealand in 1769 to
observe the transit of Mercury and charted the whole. Cook’s dealings with the
native inhabitants were a little more satisfactory than Tasman’s, but perhaps only
because he understood that the warlike inhabitants of New Zealand were to be
treated with great caution. Ten years later, when American independence precluded
the British from sending convicts to North America, Cook’s reports that Australia
was more sparsely populated and the natives “timorous and inoffensive,”1 led to
Botany Bay being preferred as the site of a new British penal colony. That was a
decision calamitous for the Aborigines of Australia. Settlement of the Australian
continent proceeded on the basis that the land was terra nullius, owned by no one.
The assumption was to warp the Australian legal system and its response to its
native peoples in a way that is only now being addressed, amid high public anxiety.
From the beginning of the nineteenth century, New Zealand, despite the fearsome
reputation of the native inhabitants, was regularly visited by ships to harvest timber,
whales, and seals. Many whaling vessels in New Zealand waters were from the
eastern seaboard of the United States. Some of the native New Zealanders were
taken on as seamen and travelled to Australia, the United States, and Europe. Those
who returned brought knowledge of other societies. Missionaries set up stations,
especially in the far north. Deserters from ships and escaped convicts from New
South Wales and Tasmania settled in New Zealand and took native New Zealand
women as wives. The European population was lawless and disruptive of Mäori
society. They were avid for land and exploited tribal conflicts to obtain it. The
goods they exchanged for land included muskets, which were then used by the
northern tribes to settle old scores in terrible fashion against tribes armed only with
stone-age weapons. Europeans were sometimes complicit in the worst atrocities. As
a result, there was huge dislocation of native peoples as they fled from their tribal
homes and sheltered in inaccessible parts of the country, sometimes for decades.
(These dislocations were much later to cause injustice when customary native title
to land was supplanted by title principally based on occupation at the date of British
annexation in 1840.)
The state of lawlessness in New Zealand led the missionaries and their supporters
in England to promote British intervention. The British colonial office was itself
reluctant. Instead it sent a British Resident as envoy, to do what he could by
persuasion and example. James Busby’s residency was set up at Waitangi, in the
Bay of Islands in the north of the country. He promoted Mäori political organization
through assemblies of the chiefs of the north. With his encouragement, they adopted
a flag, so that New Zealand shipping would be recognized internationally. In 1835
they made a declaration of independence, asserting their sovereignty over their
respective territories. The flag and the declaration were formally acknowledged by

1. THE EXPLORATIONS OF CAPTAIN JAMES COOK IN THE PACIFIC: AS TOLD BY SELECTIONS OF HIS OWN
JOURNALS 1768–1779, at 84 (A. Grenfell Price ed., 1971).
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the British government. But such preliminary moves towards local political
organization were overtaken before they could develop.
It became increasingly urgent to address European lawlessness and landgrabbing. It is estimated that at the time there were 100,000 native New Zealanders,
belonging to an estimated fourteen loose groupings, comprising many distinct
tribes, or hapu. Before contact, they had no common name for themselves because
they identified only with their tribes. After contact, they came to refer to themselves
as “Mäori,” or the common people, although for many years the Europeans referred
to them as New Zealanders. There were perhaps 2,000 Europeans living in New
Zealand in 1840 but within a few years the European population had increased
fivefold. The native tribes were acknowledged to own the whole of the land of New
Zealand, according to their customs and usages, but Europeans had purported to
purchase substantial tracts. One such estate was purportedly acquired by an
American settler, William Webster, who was described by a contemporary as “half
horse, half alligator, with a touch of earthquake.”2 His claim to title to the land was
eventually rejected in an international arbitration between the United States and
Britain not determined until long after his death by a panel that included the
distinguished American, Roscoe Pound. (The award held that the Treaty of
Waitangi was valid as a treaty of cession.) The late 1830s also saw land speculators
organizing British immigration on a large scale. Because of the social disintegration
which had followed the musket wars, it was not clear that they were dealing with
those with the authority to sell the land. There were also fears of French intentions
towards the country.
In 1839 the British Colonial Office dispatched Captain William Hobson to treat
with the native New Zealanders for the cession of their territories and for an
acknowledgement that land they wished to sell could be sold only to the Crown.
The Colonial Secretary explained the decision as being prompted by the need to
establish legal order and to avoid the repetition in New Zealand of “the calamities
by which the aborigines of American and African colonies have been afflicted.” The
instructions to Hobson stressed that he was to act scrupulously in his dealing with
Mäori.3 New Zealand was not to be annexed by the British Crown “unless the free
and intelligent consent of the natives, expressed according to their established
usages, shall be first obtained.” Mäori were to be “carefully defended in the
observance of their own customs, so far as compatible with the universal maxims
of humanity and morals.” With the exception of customs “in conflict with the
universal laws of morality,” the expectation was that there was “no reason why the
native New Zealanders might not be permitted to live among themselves according
to their national laws or usages.”4
The expectation that Mäori custom was not to be interfered with and that Mäori
might be “permitted to live among themselves according to their national laws or

2. THE FOUNDING OF NEW ZEALAND: THE JOURNALS OF FELTON MATHEW, FIRST SURVEYOR-GENERAL
OF NEW ZEALAND, AND HIS WIFE, 1840–1847, at 133 (J. Rutherford ed., 1940).
3. CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE RELATIVE TO NEW ZEALAND, 1840, [238], at 37
(Letter from Lord Normanby to Captain Hobson dated Aug. 14, 1839).
4. REPORT FROM THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON NEW ZEALAND, 1844, [556] app. 19, at 475 (Copy of a
Despatch from Lord Stanley to the Officer administering the Government dated June 21, 1843).
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usages” was in accordance with the British Colonial policy described in relation to
North American indigenous peoples by Chief Justice Marshall in Worcester v.
Georgia.5 The policy of Britain, he said, was to treat such people as “nations
capable of maintaining the relations of peace and war; of governing themselves,
under her protection; and she made treaties with them, the obligation of which she
acknowledged.”
In February of 1840 Hobson entered into the Treaty of Waitangi with the
northern chiefs on the beautiful headland overlooking the Bay of Islands where the
British Resident had his home. The Treaty was eventually signed by 500 chiefs
from all around the country. There were two versions, in English and Mäori. The
Mäori version was signed by all but a handful of Mäori. The Treaty comprised a
preamble and three short articles. The preamble explained the reasons for seeking
the treaty in terms of Queen Victoria’s wish to protect the “just Rights and
Property” of the Native Chiefs and Tribes threatened by both the existing European
settlement and “the rapid extension of Emigration both from Europe and Australia
which is still in progress.…” It sought to “secure to [the Chiefs and Tribes] the
enjoyment of Peace and Good Order” and to “avert the evil consequences” of
absence of laws and settled government. In the English language version the three
articles provided for: (1) the cession of sovereignty to Queen Victoria; (2)
confirmation and guarantee to the “Chiefs and Tribes of New Zealand and to the
respective families and individuals thereof the full exclusive and undisturbed
possession of their Lands and Estates Forests Fisheries and other properties which
they may collectively or individually possess so long as it is their wish and desire
to retain the same in their possession,” with the chiefs yielding however to the
Queen the exclusive right to purchase any land that “the proprietors thereof may be
disposed to alienate” at prices to be agreed; and (3) the extension to the natives of
New Zealand of the Queen’s protection and the conferral upon them of all the rights
and privileges of British Subjects. The terms of the subscription were that the
signing chiefs signed in respect of the tribes and territories over which they claimed
authority.
The Mäori language version of the Treaty translated “sovereignty” not as mana
(the Mäori word which had been used for “sovereignty” in the 1835 Declaration of
Independence), but kawanatanga. It was a coined word used in the Mäori bible to
describe the “governorship” of Pontius Pilate. Mäori, in return, were guaranteed not
only their taonga, or treasured possessions, and habitations, but the tino
rangatiratanga, or highest chieftanship, in them. In the bible, rangatiratanga was
used to describe the authority of God. In the explanations given at the time the
Treaty was entered into, Mäori received assurances that their customs would not be
interfered with. In these circumstances, one great chief explained the consequence
of the Treaty as having been to pass only the shadow of the land to the Queen, while
preserving the substance and the authority of their lands to Mäori. He was later to
change his mind.

5. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 548–49 (1832); see also Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823);
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
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This account sets the stage for what will be here a familiar general pattern for
indigenous peoples soon overwhelmed by a settler population. The upshot was
probably inevitable. Despite the property guarantee of the Treaty and the
acknowledgment from the outset that all the land in New Zealand was owned by the
various tribes according to their customs and usages, no effective system for legal
protection of land held according to custom was established before responsible
government was transferred to the settlers. Huge settlement occurred from the
1860s. Before then, in about 1858, the European population had passed that of
Mäori.
In 1877 a New Zealand court decided that there was no customary law of the
Mäori of which the courts could take cognizance.6 It held that the Treaty of
Waitangi was a “simple nullity” both because it was entered into by “savages” who
lacked the capacity to enter into such a Treaty and because, irrespective of its effect
in international law, it had no domestic effect according to the orthodox English
view of treaties.
Although the Privy Council in London, on appeals from New Zealand, tried to
correct the position in relation to common law recognition of native title, the local
view prevailed until its reconsideration by the New Zealand Court of Appeal in
2003. The failure of the courts in application of the common law to recognize title
to land held according to native custom was compounded by statutory disadvantage.
From 1909 those holding land according to native custom were prevented from
asserting their title against the Crown. Nor could they bring actions for ejectment
or trespass without the intervention of the Attorney General. Substitution of Crown
title for customary land, undertaken from the 1860s, rapidly achieved
individualization of title, in a crude approximation of English property which
ignored overlapping interests and failed to recognize interests in waters. The
individualization of land titles in this way destroyed communal ownership and
undermined tribal society. Land wars in the 1860s were precipitated by government
purchases that were disputed or opposed. They led to substantial confiscation of
tribal lands by those considered to be in rebellion. Policies of assimilation followed
in which there was substantial denial of culture. Mäori religions were suppressed
and native marriage and adoption were not recognized.
Today, customary land has been almost entirely replaced by Mäori freehold land,
held in common, generally in smaller family groupings and regulated through the
Mäori Land Court. In 2008, only 5 percent of the land in New Zealand is Mäori
freehold land, held of the Crown in fee. Eighty percent is classified as poor land for
farming, with perhaps 30 percent being landlocked.
The view that the Treaty had no effect in domestic law was the subject of some
dispute in early years. The retired first Chief Justice of New Zealand argued in
1861, in protest at the land wars, that sovereignty (or “governorship” in the Mäori
version of the Treaty) was to be seen and defined by reference to its object. On this
argument, the sovereignty obtained by the British Crown was qualified by the
Treaty of Waitangi. That is not the way it has been treated as a matter of domestic
law in New Zealand. The view that the Treaty is not part of the domestic law of
6. Wi Parata v. Bishop of Wellington, [1877] 3 N.Z. Jur. (N.S.) 72 (S.C.).
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New Zealand, except in so far as it has been incorporated by legislation, was
eventually endorsed in a perfunctory decision by the Privy Council in 19427 and has
not been reconsidered by the New Zealand courts.
The path of diminished sovereignty adopted in the United States in the Cherokee
cases8 by Chief Justice Marshall has not been followed in New Zealand, although
in 1840 and for some time afterwards it remained an open possibility. Until its
repeal in 1986, the New Zealand Constitution Act, 1852, provided for the gazetting
of Mäori Districts in which Mäori custom would operate as law provided it was not
“repugnant to the general Principles of Humanity.”9 No such districts were gazetted.
Legislation has provided for marae (tribal) courts in minor matters, but they have
never been established. Limited control, provided in legislation in 1900 over liquor
control, health, and education, did not survive.10 Claims for a measure of autonomy
have nevertheless been made by Mäori throughout New Zealand history. Since
James Busby had first promoted the idea of a Mäori Parliament, before the Treaty
was signed, the idea has continued to exert a hold on Mäori imagination. Such
“Parliaments” were held by Mäori loyalists at the time of the land wars in 1869 and
1879 and were later advocated by the tribes who were defeated in the wars.
In 1884, Tawhiao (the second Mäori king set up by a land league adopted by a
number of tribes to stop further sales of land) left the King Country where he had
remained a refugee after the land wars and led a Mäori delegation to London to
petition the Queen to “grant a government to your Mäori subjects…that they may
have power to make laws regarding their own lands, and race, lest they perish by the
ills which have come upon them.”11 His hope was the establishment of Mäori
Districts under the Constitution Act. The British government was sympathetic and
recommended this solution to the New Zealand government, which had
responsibility for Mäori affairs. But Mäori autonomy in Districts was not the vision
of the New Zealand government. And, in any event, when the Land Court issued
titles in respect of the King Country and it was opened up to the new railway, it was
soon too late for the creation of a Mäori District there. At least since the beginning
of the twentieth century, claims for a degree of autonomy have been widely
regarded as preposterous by those who have forgotten the idea of Mäori Districts
and the initial indications and assurances of self-government.
I do not want to suggest that the idea of distinct Mäori Districts was the best
outcome Mäori could have obtained. In some ways it might have suited the settler
governments to effect a partial exclusion of Mäori. Whether a reservation policy of
limited sovereignty in the United States has been, overall, a good thing is not
something upon which I am qualified to express a view. But it was not the approach
followed in New Zealand.

7. See Hoani Te Heuheu Tukino v. Aotea District Mäori Land Board, [1941] A.C. 308.
8. See Cherokee, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1; Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515.
9. 15 & 16 Vict., c. 72, § 71 (1852).
10. The Mäori Councils Act, 1900, gave limited authority to eleven tribal councils and, below them, village
committees, in matters of sanitation, liquor control, health, and education. The Act was put forward to blunt Mäori
support for more extensive political autonomy, as proposed by the Kotahitanga (Mäori Parliament) movement.
11. REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM, TOWARDS A BETTER DEMOCRACY
app. B, at B-26 (1986).

Spring 2009]

FIRST PEOPLES AND HUMAN RIGHTS

305

With loss of tribal social structures and territories and the substantial integration
of Mäori into the wider community, particularly with increasing urbanization, very
little practical opportunity for such accommodation may now exist. Mäori political
activity instead has focused on representation through the Parliamentary processes.
The separate Mäori seats were first proposed as a temporary expedient in the 1860s
when four were established.12 Separate representation for those who opt to go on the
Mäori roll is still in place under the current system of proportional representation.
The seats have increased and are currently seven.
From the mid-1970s there were widespread protests about the loss of Mäori land.
They were accompanied by calls to “ratify” the Treaty of Waitangi. In 1975 the
New Zealand Parliament enacted legislation to set up a tribunal, the Waitangi
Tribunal, to consider claims of breach of the Treaty of Waitangi and to recommend
to the government what steps it should take to remedy such breaches, including by
reconsideration of legislation inconsistent with the Treaty.13 The process, though
conducted by a tribunal acting in a judicial manner, was set up to assist the Crown
in a political response. Nevertheless, the Tribunal has played a pivotal role in
bringing to the attention of the public and the courts the Treaty and the claims made
under it.
It is difficult for those of us who have lived through the years since to think back
to how ignorant we non-Mäori were of our history. Few would ever have read the
text of the Treaty before it was attached as a schedule to the Treaty of Waitangi Act
in 1975. The content of the Treaty was not taught as part of the constitutional law
curriculum in our law schools, much less in the schools. It was thought of as a
historical artifact. The Waitangi Tribunal itself started slowly. It was not until it
published its first major report in 198314—on the pollution of fishing reefs valued
by the Taranaki tribes—that the current claims of our indigenous peoples became
accessible to a wider audience.
After years of disappointment in litigation, Mäori had given up seeking to
advance their claims through the courts. As a result, generations of lawyers had
failed to appreciate the arguments that could be made on their behalf. The Canadian
litigation then current about fishing rights, made accessible by the Waitangi
Tribunal, was a revelation. Claims to the Tribunal were made in relation to land
losses, fishing rights, and the retention of the Mäori language. The Waitangi
Tribunal reports provided a bridge for non-Mäori into the values and traditions of
Mäori, and in particular their spiritual association with land and waters.
While these claims were being brought, the government in the mid-1980s was
embarked on a major restructuring of government activities. The reforms entailed
the transfer of substantial land holdings of the Crown to corporate bodies and the
privatization of the fisheries through a transferable quota system which regulated
commercial fishing through property rights. At the last minute, it was appreciated
by Mäori that claims to the Waitangi Tribunal could be disappointed if the Crown
had divested itself of the properties from which reparation could be sought.
12. See Mäori Representation Act, 1867 (N.Z.).
13. See Treaty of Waitangi Act, 1975 (N.Z.).
14. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, REPORT OF THE WAITANGI TRIBUNAL ON THE MOTUNUI-WAITARA CLAIM
(Wai 6) (1983).
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Litigation was launched to prevent the Crown transferring the land, forests, and
fisheries assets and to stop it divesting itself of the capacity to provide for Mäori
language broadcasting. The litigation succeeded in shutting down a major
government initiative until procedural safeguards had been put in place to safeguard
Crown capacity to meet its Treaty obligations.
Eventually, the litigation led to substantial settlements which in the last ten years
have resulted in the transfer of land, forest, and fisheries assets to tribal authorities.
The settlements have led to the establishment of a number of tribal radio stations
and to the establishment of a Mäori television channel. These achievements are
important in themselves. But, even more importantly, the decisions of the Court of
Appeal brought the Treaty of Waitangi out of mothballs and into the consciousness
of the nation. They also placed us in touch with the more recent North American
case law and ideas about indigenous people, after more than a century of neglect.
II. THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF INDIGENOUS CLAIMS
Resurgence of Mäori claims was part of a world-wide move for recognition by
indigenous people. The position of indigenous peoples has been taken up in the past
decades by international organizations. The United Nations and the Organization
of American States are now looking critically at our domestic laws. I therefore deal
with the international context before coming back to compare our national legal
systems.
An initial problem for international recognition of the rights of indigenous
peoples lies in the definition of what makes a distinct group “indigenous.” Professor
Erica-Irene Daes, longtime chairperson–rapporteur of the United Nations Working
Group on Indigenous Populations, thought a formal definition should not be
adopted. Instead she suggests a list of factors relevant to understand the term
“indigenous.” They are:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)

Priority in time, with respect to the occupation and use of a specific
territory;
The voluntary perpetuation of cultural distinctiveness, which may include
the aspects of language, social organization, religion and spiritual values,
modes of production, laws and institutions;
Self-identification, as well as recognition by other groups, or by State
authorities, as a distinctive collectivity; and
An experience of subjugation, marginalization, dispossession, exclusion
or discrimination, whether or not these conditions persist. 15

The Canadian academic, Will Kymlicka, says that the position taken by the
United Nations is “surprisingly simple.” It regards indigenous peoples as entitled
to “accommodation.”16 Minorities, by contrast, it regards as having rights to
integration and non-discrimination.

15. U.N. Comm’n on Human Rights, Sub-Comm. on Prevention of Discrimination & Prot. of Minorities,
Working Group on Indigenous Populations, Working Paper by the Chairperson–Rapporteur, Mrs. Erica-Irene A.
Daes, on the concept of “indigenous people,” ¶ 69, U.N. Doc. E/CN 4/Sub 2/AC 4/1996/2 (June 10, 1996)
(emphasis added).
16. Will Kymlicka, The Internationalization of Minority Rights, 6 INT’L J. CONST. L. 1, 3 (2008).
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It is possible that the increased international attention to the position of
indigenous peoples may spur national governments to reconsider priorities within
their own legal orders. But it is not clear that there will be real advantage for the
peoples long recognized as indigenous under established relationships in postcolonial societies in this recent development. And certainly the governments of the
older former British colonies seem skeptical about the direction being taken by the
United Nations and its application to their circumstances.
When the General Assembly voted overwhelmingly to adopt a Declaration after
twenty-five years of negotiation over the rights of native peoples to protect their
lands and cultures, the four countries that voted against the motion were Australia,
Canada, New Zealand, and the United States. It is interesting to note in passing that
the British representative also expressed reservations about the very concept of
“collective human rights in international law,” taking the view that international law
recognized human rights as individual rights.17 Collective rights, on the other hand
were “bestowed at the national level.” This position seems to be contrary to the
view expressed by Justice Joseph Story and relied on in British colonial practice
that customary international law conferred obligations on colonial powers to respect
the property rights of the inhabitants.18 But it is the reasons expressed by the four
countries that voted against the Declaration that are of particular interest.
The United States and Canada voted against the Declaration in part because of
concerns about its looseness of expression, but more substantively because it was
thought to cut across the arrangements their jurisdictions had already entered into
with their indigenous peoples. The Canadian representative said that the provisions
requiring free, prior, and informed consent before dealing with indigenous peoples
were “unduly restrictive” and that the recognition of interests in land failed to
acknowledge that there were a range of rights and possibly “put[] into question
matters that had been settled by treaty” in Canada. The U.S. representative pointed
to the solution adopted in the United States that Indian tribes are “political entities
with inherent powers of self-government as first peoples.” It therefore said it had
a “government to government” relationship with Indian tribes by which it promoted
tribal self-government over a broad range of internal and local affairs “including
determination of membership, culture, language, religion, education, information,
social welfare, economic activities, and land and resources management.”
The reasons of Australia and New Zealand for not supporting the Declaration
similarly reflected domestic preoccupations. The Australian representative
expressed concern that the proposal went beyond supporting and encouraging “the
full engagement of indigenous peoples in the democratic decision-making process”
and could impair “the territorial and political integrity of a State with a system of
democratic representative Government.” The security of land tenure, and the
primacy of domestic laws—including the Native Title Act,19 enacted after the

17. Press Release, General Assembly, General Assembly Adopts Declaration on Rights of Indigenous
Peoples; ‘Major Step Forward’ Towards Human Rights for All, Says President, U.N. Doc. GA/10612 (Sept. 13,
2007).
18. See Paul McHugh, Aboriginal Title in New Zealand Courts, 2 CANTERBURY L. REV. 235, 238–39
(1984); see also JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 3–7 (1833).
19. Native Title Act, 1993 (Austl.).
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Mabo20 decision—were also cited. Nor did Australia accept an obligation to consult
with indigenous peoples about laws affecting them because that “would apply a
standard for indigenous peoples that did not apply to others in the population.”
“Australia could not accept a right that allowed a particular sub-group of the
population to be able to veto legitimate decisions of a democratic and representative
Government.” Australia did not accept that indigenous customary law (which it
considered was not “law” properly so described) should be “in a superior condition
to national law.” Given that the incoming government in Australia, which took
office a few months ago, said in its election manifesto that it intended to join the
Declaration, it may be that these attitudes are shifting. 21
New Zealand opposed aspects of the Declaration on the basis of human rights
and rule-of-law concerns. The New Zealand representative said that indigenous
rights in New Zealand were of profound importance and integral to New Zealand’s
identity as a Nation State and as a people. New Zealand was described as “unique”
by reason of its “founding document,” the Treaty of Waitangi. Its indigenous
minority was said to be “one of the largest and most dynamic indigenous minorities
in the world.” New Zealand however, had difficulty with four provisions which
were “fundamentally incompatible with New Zealand’s constitutional and legal
arrangements, the Treaty of Waitangi, and the principle of governing for the good
of all its citizens.” It was of particular concern that the provisions were said to
imply “that indigenous peoples had rights that others did not have” or suggested
rights of “veto over a democratic legislature” and “different classes of citizenship.”
This suggests caution about the very concept of indigeneity.
The anxieties expressed by New Zealand may in part reflect the inevitable
uncertainties in a country without a written constitution. In such a system caution
in relation to any obligation that might impinge upon the constitution is
understandable. The New Zealand concerns may also reflect the ambiguity of the
status of the Treaty of Waitangi in domestic law and any promise to be inferred
from it as to the priority to be accorded to Mäori. Similarly, the Australian
statements can in part be put down to the fear of disruption to existing land tenure,
which caused such political storm when the High Court of Australia in the 1990s
in the Mabo and Wik22 cases rejected the assumption of terra nullius upon which
Australian titles to land had been based. So some of the concerns expressed can be
put down to local preoccupations and political realities. But I think beyond such
particular self-interest—which may or may not be enduring over time—remain
substantial questions about the usefulness of an international concept of indigeneity
within national legal orders, and worries about preferential treatment and the
implications for human rights and, especially, equality of treatment of all citizens.
In the international community the starkness of the distinction between minorities
and indigenous peoples is suspect. “Homeland minorities” assert similar claims to
indigenous people in many countries without a colonial past but in which there have
20. Mabo v. Queensland II, (1992) 175 C.L.R. 1.
21. As this speech was being edited for publication, the Australian government formally endorsed the
Declaration. See Experts Hail Australia’s Backing of U.N. Declaration of Indigenous People’s Rights, U.N. NEWS
CENTRE, Apr. 3, 2009, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=30382&Cr=indigenous&Cr1.
22. Wik Peoples v. Queensland, (1996) 187 C.L.R .1.
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been successive waves of immigration. Examples include the Kurds, Kashmiris,
Catalans, and Tamils—peoples around whom some of the more pressing ethnic
conflicts in the world are happening. There is inconsistency between nations in the
treatment of the same peoples. For example, while Norway and Finland treat the
Sami people as indigenous, Sweden regards them as a national minority. The
additional concern expressed by the international order for the “indigenous” is
encouraging minorities to reposition themselves under the label. Conversely, there
are indications that new immigrant groups may be less willing to be content with
integration and assimilation and seek for themselves separate identity and autonomy
in internal matters.
Our national legal orders do not need these strains of definition and international
politics if they are to conscientiously address claims, the justice of which arises out
of our own histories and traditions and which are already acknowledged, if only in
part. Building on those histories may be a surer foundation than what is a highly
contestable abstract concept. Identifying who are the indigenous peoples according
to original occupation is questionable, as Locke, Blackstone, and Nozick have
suggested in relation to property and sovereignty.23 Indeed, Jeremy Waldron
suggests that such a concept not only raises “serious problems of exclusion” which
he says are inherently “creepy” in their underlying assumption of legitimism, but
also entail “considerable dangers in exposing modern distributions of power and
property to the arcane details of recondite historical and prehistorical inquiry.”24
A more modest principle of prior occupancy is also problematical. It raises issues
of timing and relativity and can apply only on a prima facie basis which must be
adjusted to meet developing expectations and other claims to redistribution of
power or property. Waldron’s conclusion is that the general discourse of indigeneity
is more volatile and less helpful in solving the problems of national legal orders
than paying closer attention to “our own legal and ideological resources.”25 So,
although the international movement may prod domestic orders to do better, on this
view the future is more likely to require closer attention to our domestic traditions.
III. COMPARATIVE LAW
What of comparative domestic approaches? It is clear that there is often much to
learn from other jurisdictions, particularly if they have similar historical origins. But
it is necessary to be careful. All of us have had different histories and experiences
that have shaped our law and politics.
One experience common to all jurisdictions is that the original path followed in
relation to the property of indigenous peoples on contact cannot readily be undone.
Too many people quickly obtain vested interests in the status quo. In the United
States, a brief flirtation in the late seventeenth century with the idea that the Indians
lacked capacity to sell land was swiftly repudiated by the settlers who had already
acquired property from the Indians.26 In Australia, the tragic dispossession of
23. See Jeremy Waldron, Indigeneity? First Peoples and Last Occupancy, 1 N.Z. J. PUB. & INT’L L. 55,
68–73 (2003).
24. Id. at 80.
25. Id. at 82.
26. See STUART BANNER, HOW THE INDIANS LOST THEIR LAND 10–48 (2005).
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possibly more than a million Aborigines under the terra nullius doctrine gave every
landowner in Australia an interest in maintaining it. It is not surprising that the
political storm that met the High Court of Australia’s recognition that the common
law should have recognized aboriginal interests and that their interests are not
inconsistent with the grazing licenses that cover so much of Australia27 led to
legislation that sets up a limited basis for native title claims, grounded in traditional
and uninterrupted use.28 It may be dangerous for the same approach to be used as
a model in countries where the issues are not comparable.
In New Zealand, there has been less scope for disappointment of settled
expectations. The relatively prompt investigation by the Crown of all pre-Treaty
sales meant that no European-held land was held post-Treaty except from the
Crown. Except for those pre-Treaty purchases confirmed on investigation, all land
available for purchase by Europeans had been converted into land held in fee of the
Crown either by direct Crown purchase from Mäori or, after the setting up of the
Land Court, by conversion of native property interests into title held in fee of the
Crown before such sale. The effectiveness of these mechanisms, however, led to the
loss of tribal lands and eroded the practical ability to meet aspirations of selfgovernment. These are the principal points of distinction between New Zealand’s
response and that of the United States. Failure to appreciate these differences has
led at times to misuse of American reasoning in New Zealand case law in relation
to the nature of native property interests.
A. The Nature of Aboriginal Property
When Britain was considering annexing New Zealand in 1839 it was in part
because of plans by the New Zealand Company to set up large settlements. The
New Zealand Company was well-aware of the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court
in Johnson v. M’Intosh29 and quick to recognize how the notion that native tribes
had only a right of occupation and use of Crown lands suited the land needs of their
organized settlement program. The approach in Johnson was not the approach of the
Colonial Office, which consistently with its normal practice, intended the protection
of property according to native custom. The Treaty implemented that policy. The
New Zealand Company however continued to press for a more limited notion of
occupation rights, as a moral responsibility only on the title of the Crown. When the
government in the United Kingdom changed to one more sympathetic to the notions
of John Locke—that recognition of property rights should be confined to cultivated
land—steps were taken in the late 1840s to bring in a policy of waste lands. Under
it, lands not cultivated were to be treated as surplus to native requirements and the
property of the Crown, free to be allocated by Crown grant to settlers. Fortunately
for Mäori, that initiative was seen by the Governor of the day to be likely to bring
about war. Mäori were then too numerous for the government to be able safely to
undertake such a course.

27. See Mabo v. Queensland II, (1992) 175 C.L.R. 1.
28. Native Title Act, 1993 (Austl.).
29. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
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In the early years, New Zealand therefore did not adopt in relation to land the
view of Johnson put forward by the New Zealand Company that with sovereignty
the state obtained property, qualified by the use rights of the native people. Nor was
the approach the same as that applied in Canada by which the Crown obtained
“substantial and paramount estate” although encumbered by the occupation rights
of the Indian inhabitants.30 Rather, in New Zealand the radical title received by the
Crown was a notional one (part of its sovereign powers), enabling it to grant Crown
title on investigation and not a property interest.
The ideas expressed in Johnson were not acted on in the 1840s, but they
remained highly influential. Worcester v. Georgia (in which a different emphasis
is apparent) seems not to have been cited in New Zealand. In 1877 the Court of
Appeal, relying on Johnson, held that Mäori had insufficient social organization
upon which to found property rights recognizable by the new legal order.31 In such
circumstances, it was said:
[T]he supreme executive Government must acquit itself, as best it may, of its
obligation to respect native proprietary rights, and of necessity must be the sole
arbiter of its own justice. Its acts in this particular cannot be examined or called
in question by any tribunal, because there exist no known principles whereon a
regular adjudication can be based. 32

This approach was repudiated by the Privy Council in Nireaha Tamaki v. Baker,
which said that it was “rather late in the day” for it to be said there was no
customary law of the Mäori of which the courts of law could take cognizance.33 But
the local judges and politicians did not let it go. They remained of the view that
Mäori proprietary interests were merely rights to occupation against a property
interest obtained by the Crown with sovereignty under the Treaty. The Crown
observed Mäori interests as a matter of grace, because they were binding only on
the conscience of the Crown. The Treaty of Waitangi was treated as a pact of no
significance in domestic law. In a celebrated rebellion by the New Zealand judges
to another rebuke from the Privy Council, Chief Justice Stout asserted in a public
sitting of the court to voice the protest of the judges and the profession that “[a]ll
lands of the Colony belonged to the Crown, and it was for the Crown under Letters
Patent to grant to the parties to the Treaty such lands as the Crown had agreed to
grant.” 34
The full implications of this misapplied imported doctrine may not ultimately
have been of great direct significance in relation to Mäori land. That was because
of the efficient program of land purchases undertaken by the Crown in the 1850s
and then the conversion of customary property into Crown-granted title by the Land
Court. After the setting up of the Mäori Land Court in the 1860s, there were

30. See St. Catherine’s Milling and Lumber Co. v. R., [1888] 14 App. Cas. 46, 55 (P.C.) (appeal taken from
Can.).
31. See Wi Parata v. Bishop of Wellington, [1877] 3 N.Z. Jur. (N.S.) 72, 77 (S.C.). This, interestingly, was
the view taken in the Webster arbitration. See William Webster Claim, No. 31, (Anglo-Am. Claims Trib. Dec. 12,
1925), in 20 AM. J. INT’L L. 391, 393–94 (1926).
32. Wi Parata, [1877] 3 N.Z. Jur. (N.S.) at 78 (Prendergast, C.J.).
33. (1901) N.Z.P.C.C. 371, 382 (Davey, L.).
34. Wallis v. Solicitor-General, (1903) N.Z.P.C.C. 23 app. at 732.
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considerable incentives and pressure on Mäori to convert their customary tenure
(whatever it was) into fee lands held of the Crown. But in the meantime, it may be
that the tough line taken by the New Zealand courts in applying Johnson could have
affected the terms of land purchases and the attitude of the settler government in
dealings with Mäori, to their detriment.
The conflation of sovereignty with property continued to influence the shape of
legislation. Legislation in 1909 prevented the assertion of Mäori customary property
against the Crown35 and denied native proprietors access to the courts to eject
trespassers (leaving it to the Crown to take steps to protect the proprietors under a
provision which “deemed” the land to be Crown land).36 The legislation was
substantially the product of Sir John Salmond, perhaps New Zealand’s most famous
jurist and the author of widely regarded works on jurisprudence and torts, well
received in the United States and in England. Salmond was the sort of person who
presented his arguments as though there were no other point of view. He considered
that the Crown’s proprietary interest was burdened with the native interest, but
thought that was a political obligation for Parliament to address.37 That has been an
enduring thread in New Zealand thinking from the New Zealand Company onwards.
Modern commentators in this tradition regard accommodation for the indigenous
New Zealanders as a political claim, rather than a legal one.
As Solicitor General at a time when Mäori fishing rights were being litigated,
Salmond advanced the view that the acquisition of sovereignty extinguished such
property interests in favor of the Crown. In relation to fishing and foreshores lands
the argument was eventually largely successful. In the Ninety-Mile Beach case
Mäori asserted property in foreshore land as a defense to breach of the fishing
regulations.38 The Crown’s argument in the case was that the Crown’s duty to
protect Mäori customary rights of occupation was a moral duty, not a legal one,
until the Crown granted title. To recognize property before such title was granted
would be to deny the sovereign power. The Court of Appeal held that the foreshore
land (which had not been the subject of Crown grant through investigation by the
Mäori Land Court) was vested in the Crown.
The Ninety-Mile Beach case foreclosed indirect court recognition of customary
property. (Direct claim was still prevented under legislation that continued the 1909
prohibition on assertion of customary interests against the Crown.)39 It was not until
2003, after a new Mäori Land Act had repealed the prohibition on claiming
customary property against the Crown,40 that the case was revisited.41 The then
Court of Appeal held that Mäori could not be precluded from bringing claims to
have customary proprietary interests in foreshore and seabed from being
determined. It held that the transfer of sovereignty did not affect customary
property. It was preserved by the common law until extinguished in accordance with

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Native Land Act, 1909, § 84 (N.Z.).
Id. § 88.
ALEX FRAME, SALMOND: SOUTHERN JURIST 125–26 (1995).
In re The Ninety-Mile Beach, [1963] N.Z.L.R. 461 (C.A.).
Native Land Act, 1931, § 112 (N.Z.); Mäori Affairs Act, 1953, § 155 (N.Z.).
Te Ture Whenua Mäori Act, 1993 (N.Z.).
See Attorney-General v. Ngati Apa, [2003] 3 N.Z.L.R. 643 (C.A.).
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law.42 In respect of foreshore and seabed lands, subsequent legislation now prevents
property interests being recognized but provides for compensation and remedies by
way of reserves and shared management of particular fishing areas.43
B. Self-government Claims also Arise in Different Contexts
Although claims for inherent sovereignty are made in many post-colonial
societies by native peoples, the responses are very different. In the United States,
a residual sovereignty in Indian nations has meant that any limitation of tribal selfgovernment has to be justified in law.44 In Canada, by contrast, the case law to date
requires self-government rights to be established by the band asserting them as
custom on the test that such regulation is “integral to the distinctive culture,”45 a test
that is also applied to claims for tribal properties.46
Where space for self-government is preserved, demarcation issues of the sort
raised in U.S. case law arise.47 The legal system needs to identify what limits
prescribed by its laws restrict the ability of the community to govern itself. This
raises questions about the fundamental values in the legal system, such as
observance of human rights standards. They may be more difficult to address in
Canada than in the United States. In the United States the possession of limited
sovereignty by Indian tribes permits preferences to be seen as political
accommodations, rather than racial ones.48 And the “plenary” power of Congress
has allowed, if controversially, line-drawing in respect of fundamental values.49 The
position of the indigenous Hawaiians is less easily addressed within this framework
however.50 As the case law dealing with application of reservation laws to nonmembers shows, there remain conflict-of-laws issues that are not always
straightforward.
Claims of inherent rights to self-government, by reason of indigeneity, are more
difficult to put forward in New Zealand because of the degree of integration of the
communities and the loss of communal territories. Claims to a measure of inherent
internal sovereignty run into the meaning of the Treaty of Waitangi and whether it
was effective to cede sovereignty without limit. Empowerment by political

42. In this the Court followed the views expressed in Amodu Tijani v. Secretary, Southern Nigeria, [1921]
2 A.C. 399 (P.C.), and William Webster’s Claim, No. 31, (Anglo-Am. Claims Trib. Dec. 12, 1925), in 20 AM. J.
INT’L L. 391 (1926).
43. Section 13 of the Foreshore and Seabed Act, 2004, vests the public foreshore and seabed in the Crown.
44. See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978); see also Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S.
(5 Pet.) 1, 16–17 (1831).
45. R. v. Pamajewon, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 821, ¶¶ 24–25 (Lamer, C.J.) (quoting R. v. Van der Peet, [1996] 2
S.C.R. 507, ¶ 46).
46. See Van der Peet, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507, ¶ 74.
47. See, for example, Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978), and more recently United
States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004), in relation to criminal jurisdiction and Montana v. United States, 450 U.S.
544 (1981), and more recently, Nevada v Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001), in relation to civil jurisdiction.
48. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974) (holding that affirmative action in relation to Indian
tribes is a political preference, not a racial one because of the “unique legal status of Indian tribes”).
49. See Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1303 (2006); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez,
436 U.S. 49 (1978) (holding that tribes and tribal officials retain sovereign immunity in federal court for claims
brought under the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968).
50. See Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (2000) (holding that Hawaii cannot limit voting rights to “native
Hawaiians” for the election of nine trustees in a statewide election).
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settlement is not unthinkable (as some of the more limited attempts at autonomy in
the past suggest).51 And there are calls for marae or tribal courts to deal with minor
criminal matters. But such ideas run into the limits provided by basic values,
particularly human rights standards, and by rule of law considerations. The
statements made by the New Zealand representative in relation to the United
Nations Declaration show rule-of-law and equality concerns are a real issue for New
Zealand.52 In non-federal constitutions used to strong unitary government, claims
for self-government lead to fears of dismemberment of the state and violation of
basic constitutional principles.
As some Canadian judges have been careful to point out, self-government arises
in two different ways.53 First, it may be inherent and political; a claim to stand
outside the wider polity for particular purposes and to a greater or lesser extent.
This is the approach it seems to me adopted in the United States. It may be that such
accommodations will be rare elsewhere for the future. They have generally arisen
at the start of settlement. They may no longer be feasible where the indigenous
groups do not occupy distinct territories and where urbanization gives rise to
indigenous claims outside tribal organization. A pluralistic response raises difficult
issues of identification of indigeneity and the general rights held by individual
members of the group as part of the wider polity, including rights to equal treatment
and human rights. So I do not think we can expect the American model to spread,
except perhaps in relation to remote indigenous groupings where separatism is
available, as may be the case in regions of South America, or where a more modest
accommodation of local custom in local courts is feasible, as in some of the
jurisdictions of the Pacific.
But claims to self-government may also be property-based and derivative. Where
property is held communally, some legal ordering by the community which
possesses the property rights is necessary and inevitable.54 Where property is held
under custom, the interests are regulated by custom and administered by the group.
Canada seems to be developing such principles for such autonomy in administration
of property. At present they may be hampered by the insistence of the Supreme
Court to date that the regulation must be “integral to the distinctive culture” at the
time of contact and maintained since.55 Such an approach runs the risk of freezing
custom and preventing realization of the aspirations of the group. Much regulation
now necessary was unnecessary at contact because of abundance. The Supreme
Court decision in Delgamuukw suggests, however, that evolution of custom must
be permitted in respect of property rights in land which are exclusive.56 And it may
be that the same approach will extend to tribal regulation. The matter is developing.

51. See, e.g., Mäori Councils Act, 1900 (N.Z.) (establishing elected, self-governing councils to control the
health and welfare and moral well-being of the Mäori).
52. See Press Release, supra note 17.
53. See Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010, ¶ 111 (Lamer, C.J.); Campbell v. British
Columbia, 79 B.C.L.R. (3d) 122, ¶¶ 137–43 (B.C.S.C.) (Williamson, J.).
54. See Kent McNeil, Judicial Approaches to Self-Government Since Calder: Searching for Doctrinal
Coherence, in LET RIGHT BE DONE: ABORIGINAL TITLE, THE CALDER CASE, AND THE FUTURE OF INDIGENOUS
RIGHTS 129, 140–41 (Hamar Foster et al. eds., 2007); see also Campbell, 79 B.C.L.R. (3d) 122, ¶ 114.
55. R. v. Van der Peet, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507, ¶ 46.
56. See Delgamuukw, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010, ¶¶ 118–24 (Lamer, C.J.).
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There is however more doubt about the native title process in Australia, which
requires aboriginal claimants to establish the survival of pre-contact interests,
traditionally maintained.57 The approach means that the greater the injury to the
tribe in the past in deprivation of the ability to maintain their traditions and culture,
the smaller the surviving bundle of rights they are able to assert.
In New Zealand, it is possible that Article II of the Treaty of Waitangi, in
promising te tino rangatiratanga of property to Mäori was describing a right of
self-government derived from property, rather than a freestanding inherent right to
political self-government. The Waitangi Tribunal has said of the terms of Article
II that it would have conveyed to Mäori that they were protected not only in their
possessions but in “the mana [authority] to control them and then in accordance
with their own customs and having regard to their own cultural preferences.”58
Again, because of our history and the destruction of communally owned property,
resurrecting self-government according to customary precepts, even in relation to
tribal property, may not be feasible. Mäori social organization has been
substantially undermined. Although modern settlements are now conferring large
properties upon tribal groups, modern property-holding mechanisms such as
corporations and trusts are being employed. They may leave little scope for
traditional self-government unless the methods are adapted. These developments lie
in the future.
IV. THE FUTURE
Shall I look into the future? It is clear that in New Zealand we will need to
address a number of issues. They include the scope for rangatiratanga, or selfgovernment, and how tribal interests are properly translated into modern property
forms. But I want to touch on two issues, the status of the Treaty of Waitangi and
the relevance of law.
A. The Status of the Treaty of Waitangi
The orthodox view of the legal status of the Treaty of Waitangi is that it remains
an unincorporated treaty in domestic law. To the extent it is recognized in statutes,
it has some direct effect but is not the source of independent rights and obligations.
Sir Kenneth Keith, a distinguished international lawyer, now a member of the
International Court of Justice, raised a number of questions about this orthodoxy
more than thirty years ago.59 He pointed out that, to the extent that recognition of
indigenous property on acquisition of new territory is a principle of customary
international law, the Treaty may be declaratory of customary international law and
applicable as part of the common law.
More directly confronting the orthodoxy, he has questioned whether the
authorities denying the domestic effect of treaties are appropriate in considering a
treaty of cession. He points to considerable injustice if such a treaty is neither

57. See Native Title Act, 1993, § 62(2)(e) (Austl.).
58. REPORT OF THE WAITANGI TRIBUNAL, supra note 14, ¶ 10.2.
59. Kenneth J. Keith, International Law and New Zealand Municipal Law, in THE A.G. DAVIS ESSAYS IN
LAW 130, 146 (John F. Northey ed., 1965).
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enforceable in national law or in international law (on the basis that the previously
sovereign body has lost its sovereignty by the treaty). He asks why the Treaty of
Waitangi cannot be enforced as a contract.60
The modern statement principally relied upon in denying the domestic effect of
the Treaty is that of Lord Atkin in Attorney-General for Canada v. AttorneyGeneral for Ontario.61 He said there that a treaty does not have domestic effect if
it alters municipal law.62 A treaty of cession, it might be argued, does not alter
municipal law, but is constitutive of it. It is possible that such an argument may
point in the same direction as the claim by Sir William Martin that the Treaty of
Waitangi qualifies the sovereignty acquired by the British Crown.63 That suspicion
is earthquake inducing in New Zealand.
It may be that the status of the Treaty can be left unresolved. That might be the
preferable course. As one of our great judges once put it in referring to the status
of the Treaty, “[A] nation cannot cast adrift from its own foundations.”64 And there
is some real attraction in a pact all regard as fundamental, but which can be invoked
in different ways to meet evolving conditions. To Mäori, it has been a sacred pact
and perhaps tying it down would diminish its authority. But if constitutional reform
is ever in prospect, it is hard to see that the status of the Treaty can be avoided.
B. The Place of Law
There is a strong strand of New Zealand thinking about indigenous issues that the
Treaty of Waitangi is principally a political pact and that addressing the place of the
indigenous people who entered into it is a political exercise in which law has little
part to play. This is reminiscent of the approach taken in some of the nineteenth and
early twentieth century cases. But it is also a serious stand-alone argument.
There may be a large measure of truth in the view that adjusting the interests of
the wider state and its indigenous peoples must always be an intensely political
interest, even where there are rights, such as in treaties or other agreements which
are in recognizable legal form and may have some legal force. But I do not think it
follows that law has no role. There are two main reasons. The first arises out of the
circumstance that dealings with indigenous peoples in post-colonial societies has
almost always been based on law. As Stuart Banner makes clear in relation to the
native Indians of the United States, no settler acquiring land from Indians in the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries thought he was acting outside the law:
[E]very land transfer of any form included elements of law and elements of
power. No non-Indian acquiring Indian land thought himself unconstrained by
Anglo-American law. Whites always acquired Indian land within a legal
framework of their own construction. Law was always present, but so was power.
The more powerful whites became relative to Indians, the more they were able
to mold the legal system to produce outcomes in their favor—more sales, of

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
P.).

Id.
[1937] A.C. 326 (P.C.).
Id. at 347–48.
See SIR W. MARTIN, D.C.L., THE TARANAKI QUESTION 10 (1860).
Te Runanga O Wharekauri Rekoku, Inc, v. Attorney-General, [1993] 2 N.Z.L.R. 301, 308–09 (Cooke,
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larger tracts, at lower prices than would have existed had power relationships
been more equal.
From the Indian’s perspective, the overarching story from the early
seventeenth to the early twentieth century is thus one of decline. In the
seventeenth century when Indians and whites were close to equally powerful,
transactions in Indian land often increased the well-being of both sides.65

Law therefore was not meaningless. Land was taken according to law, although
the law was fashioned by the settlers and was increasingly adverse to native
interests. This experience was relived in New Zealand, despite the initial hopes that
their aboriginal inhabitants could be spared the calamities which, by 1840, were
well understood to have come to the Indians of North America. Challenging the
legal authority is a claim to legitimacy. Legitimacy is a substantial prize. It is
enormously powerful, even if ultimately the accommodation to meet the underlying
claim must be political. That is demonstrated in New Zealand by the litigation in the
1980s.
Secondly, the deliberative processes and necessary justification of judicial
method are critical in themselves in explaining the claims of indigenous peoples to
the wider polity. The quasi-judicial processes of the Waitangi Tribunal and the
1980s litigation in New Zealand were pivotal in a revolution in attitude towards our
indigenous peoples. Legal method requires justification for what has been done and
tells the stories the wider polity needs to hear. So I expect recourse to law to
continue.
CONCLUSION
In the end, however, the place of indigenous peoples in our societies depends on
their vision for themselves. One of my Mäori colleagues, the Chief Judge of the
Mäori Land Court, thinks it is time to move beyond this period we are in of
“transitional justice.”66 Remedying past wrongs and providing reparation are
necessary steps, but not sufficient ones. Joe Williams suggests that moving forward,
indigenous peoples must build on their own identity if they are to avoid continuing
to make the reality of the settlers the vision of the First People. Similar thoughts
have been expressed by Professor John Borrows, a Canadian Indian.67 He looks to
an interdependent future between indigenous peoples and the wider community.
Such interdependence reflects the more complicated world in which most
indigenous people now live, where many live outside traditional communities, have
intermarried with the settlers and raised families, and work within the very
bureaucracies that indigenous peoples complain about.
All of us have different histories and I have tried to tell you something of the way
New Zealand has addressed the just claims of its First Peoples. In the end, the future
lies with their vision of themselves, and it may be with building new relationships
with the wider political communities of which they are part.

65. BANNER, supra note 26, at 4.
66. Chief Judge Joe Williams, Confessions of a Native Judge: Reflections on the Role of Transitional
Justice in the Transformation of Indigeneity, LAND, RIGHTS, LAWS: ISSUES OF NATIVE TITLE, June 2008, at 10.
67. JOHN BORROWS, RECOVERING CANADA: THE RESURGENCE OF INDIGENOUS LAW 138–58 (2002).

